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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 981540-CA

Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT
THE ORDER TO DISMISS DOES NOT COMPLY
WITH STATE V. TROYER, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1980)
In a single document, the State moved to dismiss this case with prejudice after the
trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the trial court
dismissed the case (R. 67-68) (a copy of the motion and order for dismissal is contained
in the addendum). On the first page, the dismissal motion clearly states that the
suppression order substantially impaired the State's ability to proceed and cites State v.
Troyer, 866 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993) (R. 67). On the second page, the trial court
granted the State's motion as follows: "Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause

appearing therefore, the Court hereby dismisses the above case." (R. 68).
Notwithstanding, defendant asserts that the trial court's dismissal order is without
prejudice and otherwise fails to meet the requirements of Troyer. Aple. Br. at 6-7.
Defendant's contention lacks merit and should be rejected.
The concern addressed in Troyer was the development of a mechanism that would
"preserve the State's statutory right to obtain review of suppression orders that amount to
final judgments and at the same time ensure that defendants will be shielded from
potential prosecutorial manipulation." Id. at 531. Accordingly, the supreme court held
that the State would be allowed "to obtain review of suppression orders where they
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed with a case, " as long as certain
conditions were met. The first requirement is certification from the trial court that the
suppression order substantially impaired the State's case. Id. The supreme court noted
that trial court certification, as opposed to prosecutorial certification, allows defendants a
chance to object before the dismissal is entered, and yet still permits appellate review. Id.
Second, the supreme court required the State to request dismissal with prejudice in
order to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right from a dismissal. Id. at
531. This requirement prevents the State from refiling charges if the suppression order is
affirmed on appeal. Id.
In this case, a single document contains the motion and order. Read in their
natural context, the trial court's order of dismissal incorporates the Troyer requirements
2

set forth in the State's immediately proceeding motion (R. 68-69). Therefore, it is not
reasonably argued that the trial court's dismissal order was based on any other grounds
than those cited in the State's dismissal motion.
Even if the motion and accompanying order of dismissal could have been more
artfully drafted, it complies with the policy concerns undergirding Troyer. Indeed,
nothing prevented defendant from objecting to the motion to dismiss below. Moreover,
the State views itself as fully bound by the motion and order for dismissal with prejudice,
and will not seek to refile charges, no matter the appellate outcome.
Defendant's broad reliance on civil authority fails to demonstrate any basis for
interpreting the dismissal of this criminal case as other than as a dismissal with prejudice.
To do so on these facts would be to elevate form over substance. Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531
n.2. Where, as here, it is clear that the "suppression order destroys the prosecution's
case," the State may properly seek appellate review. Id.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT IS UNPRESERVED
It is uncontested that the missing front license plate on defendant's vehicle
triggered Trooper Wilson's suspicions of a possibly stolen and/or improperly registered
vehicle (R. 75: 3-4, 20, 26-27), see Aplt. Br. at add. C. See also Aple. Br. at p. 9. The
focus in the trial court therefore, was whether Trooper Wilson's suspicions of such were
reasonable, premised as they were solely on his belief that Wyoming law required the
display of both front and back license plates. As set forth in the State's opening brief,
3

based on the entirety of the evidence before it, the trial court clearly erred in finding that
,f

[t]he officer's 'assumption' does not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was

engaged in criminal activity" (R. 49), add. D. See Aple. Br. at 10-15.
In claiming that the State's argument regarding the reasonableness of the trooper's
suspicions is unpreserved, defendant parses out the trooper's suspicions of criminality
from his "assumption" concerning Wyoming traffic law, claiming that the State relied
only on the latter argument below. Aple. Br. at 7-8. However, the trooper would have
had no basis upon which to suspect the vehicle was stolen and/or improperly registered
absent his belief that Wyoming law required the display of front and back license plates,
therefore his suspicion of the former cannot be viewed in isolation from his suspicion of
the latter — they necessarily go hand in hand.
In arguing the reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of criminality, the
prosecutor did rely heavily upon a theory that the missing front plate violated Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993),1 and that this alone could justify the traffic stop (R. 45-44),
see Aple Br. at add. B. While the scope of section 41-la-1305 is a close question, it is

'Section 41-1A-1305(5) provides that
it is a class C misdemeanor to operate upon any highway of
this state any vehicle required by law to be registered without
having the license plate or plates securely attached, and the
registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle,
except that the registration card issued by the division to all
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the towing
vehicle[.]

4

undisputed that failure to display a front plate is a violation of Wyoming law, an
argument the prosecutor emphasized in his motion to reconsider (R.61-60), see Aple. Br.
at add. B. Because Trooper Wilson was correct in his surmise of Wyoming law, his
suspicion that the missing front plate in this case indicated a possibly stolen or improperly
registered vehicle was reasonable. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. If the trooper had been wrong
as to the requirements of Wyoming law, his suspicion of a stolen and/or improperly
registered vehicle based on the missing plate would have no basis. See Aplt. Br. at 13.
For these reasons, the issue as to the reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of
criminality is necessarily preserved and should be addressed by the Court.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT
THE LICENSE PLATE WAS MISSING FOR
INNOCUOUS AS OPPOSED TO CRIMINAL
PURPOSES
Defendant agrees that the basis for the trooper's suspicions of criminality in this
case was the missing front license plate. Aple. Br. at 9. He asserts, however, that
because the missing license plate was ultimately discovered on the dash of the car after
the stop was effected, that there was an innocent explanation which "diluted" the
reasonableness of the trooper's initial suspicion that the car was stolen and/or improperly
registered. Aple. Br. at 11. Defendant is mistaken.
As set forth in the State's opening brief, see Aplt. Br. at 12-13, the fact that a
suspect's conduct may be consistent with innocent behavior does not vitiate the
reasonable suspicion of an experienced officer. "To the contrary, where a defendant's
5

conduct is 'conceivably consistent with innocent... activity,' but is also 'strongly
indicative' of criminal activity, [this Court] will not hesitate to conclude that reasonable
suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1993).
Here, the failure to display a front license plate is uniquely indicative of a
potentially stolen and/or improperly registered vehicle. See Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing
supporting case law). The nature of the missing license plate violation in this case thus
distinguishes it from Baird, upon which defendant relies. See Aple. Br. At 10. As
explained in the State's opening brief, the officer's "idle curiosity" in Baird about the
color of the sticker on the out-of-state license plate was alone inadequate to raise any
similar reasonable suspicion of a potentially stolen vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 14. This case,
however, is more akin to State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 n.3 (Utah App. 1992), where
the trooper properly effected a traffic stop of a vehicle with no license plates to determine
if the vehicle in fact contained a proper temporary permit.
Based on the above, the trial court clearly erred in finding that Trooper Wilson
could not reasonably suspect criminality in this case unless he knew with absolutely
certainty that Wyoming law required both front and back license plate display. See also
Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Instead, it is sufficient that in the trooper's experience Wyoming cars
typically display front and back plates and from that experience he surmised, correctly,
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that such was required by Wyoming law. Aplt. Br. at 13, add. B (R. 59). The trial court's
erroneous suppression ruling should be overturned.2
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of
evidence and remand this case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 3 May 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

RIAN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General

2

Assuming the Court agrees that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, the
trial court correctly acknowledged that defendant's detention beyond the traffic purpose
of the stop was valid, based upon the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.
Aplt. Br. at 15. As further set forth in the State's opening brief, defendant's subsequent
consent to search was also valid and there is therefore, no need to remand for findings on
the validity of his untainted consent to search. Aplt. Br. at 16, n.7. Defendant does not
contest the validity of the trial court'sfindingsand/or the State's argument in this regard.
SeeAple. Br. at 6-12.
7
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 971400205

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,
Defendant.

The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves the court to dismiss
the above entitled action against the defendants on the ground that the suppression order will
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed in the case. See State vs. Troyer, 866
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the State moves to dismiss the above entitled case with
prejudice.
Dated this

, L

^

day of

J-tpkw, L - ^

1

. 1998.

David O. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby
dismisses the above case.
Dated this / ?

day o f ^ - X U ^' k ^'

>98.

District J u d g < y ^

~* •"-**$- 3 Oil
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